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Abstract
The end of the Cold War has provided an opportunity for scholars to do an in-depth study on the 
concept of maritime security, especially in the Asia Pacific region. One of the most important but 
often neglected concepts is maritime strategy which has been developing for centuries. Maritime 
strategy is designed for states’ survival and to protect their national interests. Nevertheless there 
is no ‘one size fits all’ concept. Therefore, the purpose of this article is to analyse the similarities 
and differences between continental states such as the United States, and India, and maritime 
states such as Indonesia, Japan, Australia, and Singapore in implementing their maritime strategy. 
In an attempt to present the results, we have reviewed secondary data mainly from the literature 
written by scholars in the field. Preliminary findings suggests that countries, either continental 
or maritime states, designed their maritime strategy for national security reasons. States aim to 
survive in the unknown international political arena. However, domestic and socioeconomic 
factors such as economic growth, geostrategic interest as well as nature of threats, may have 
shaped differences among states’ maritime strategy. The emerging non-traditional threats such 
narcotic trafficking, terrorism and human smuggling, have contributed to the threats for many 
states, this further justifies the importance of maritime strategy.
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Introduction 
International relations is not only a study 
about theory but more importantly it is a study 
about security (Nor Azizan & Zarina, 2009). 
Throughout the Cold War period, security 
studies focused on military threats such as 
war and conflicts, and weapons competitions 
between the two power blocs --one led by the 
United States and another by the Soviet Union. 
However, with the end of the Cold War--
marked by the fall of the Berlin Wall--scholars 
have given more attention to non-traditional or 
non-military security issues (Zarina, Nasuha, 
& Halim, 2013). These include issues such as 
terrorism, narcotic trafficking, and human 
smuggling. Likewise in 1989, the discussion 
about national security has also increasingly 
focused on maritime security (Corbett, 1911; 
Mahan, 1889; Till, 1984). Maritime terrorism, 
illegal fishing, smuggling and trafficking of 
people and goods, refugees and other cross 
maritime border issues, have attracted scholars 
to analyse them. To understand maritime 
security, it is necessary to discuss maritime 
strategy. Therefore, maritime strategy is 
“the comprehensive direction of all aspects 
of national power to achieve specific policy 
goals in a specific situation by exercising some 
degree of control at sea” (Hattendorf, 2013, p. 
10). This is due to the changing international 
politics such as the emerging non-traditional 
maritime security issues, which advises that 
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a maritime strategy for Indonesia is needed 
(Buddy, Zarina, & Farizal, 2018).
Like the concept of national security, 
maritime strategy varies from one country to 
another; there is no “one size fits all”. The study 
of maritime strategy by scholars as evidenced by 
the seminal works of Mahan (1889), Hattendorf 
(2004), Bruns (2014), and Rubel (2015) from the 
US, goes as far back as 1898. Maritime strategy 
is crucial for many, including for Continental 
States. Mahan (1889), a naval historian, was 
known as the first theorist to systematically 
point out the strategic importance of naval 
operations to warfare. Notably, Mahan laid 
the foundations for a theory of naval strategy 
through his comprehensive descriptions 
of the histories of modern naval warfare. 
In addition, some important points about 
Mahan’s concept are presented by Gough 
(1988), Hattendorf (1989), Klein (2004), Till 
(2005), William (2008), Vego (2009). Klein 
(2004) for example, suggested that Mahan’s 
prime contribution lies in the important links 
he established between maritime and naval 
activities to national and international issues, 
besides laying the foundations for developing 
naval strategy. Mahan examined national 
policy, sea power, sea control, offensive versus 
defensive operations, speed and mobility, 
communications, trade, concentration of force, 
and strategic position (Klein, 2004). While there 
is a national policy yet there is no national 
security policy on maritime strategy. 
There are three main conditions that 
determine the strategic value of any states 
(Mahan as cited in Vego, 2009). This includes 
the offensive or defensive military strength of 
the place, the resources of the place itself and the 
resources of the surrounding state. Although 
Mahan suggested that the main requirement 
of naval supreme power was the strength of 
heavy warships, there is a need to consider “… 
training, morale, the effectiveness of command, 
tactical disposition (in particular, the skill of 
pitting all of your force against a portion of the 
opponent’s)” besides an aggressive winning 
tactic to destroy the opponent (Till, 2005, p. 35). 
In fact, sophisticated warfare technology 
(submarine communications, cruiser warfare, 
mines, sub-marines, torpedoes) was a secondary 
factor, which means decisive naval battles are 
a key factor in maritime strategy (Mahan as 
cited in Gough, 1988). Besides the military 
aspects in naval battle, Mahan advocated 
the expansion of other areas to broaden the 
nation’s maritime strategy, especially during 
peaceful times. Moreover, commercial sea 
routes are better controlled via a mobile naval 
fleet which has strategic local ports used as the 
naval operations base (Hattendorf, 1989). The 
key guidelines developed by Mahan are as 
follows; the true objectives of the navy in times 
of war and peace; building supportive logistics 
bases; effective communications between 
these depots and the home base; the military 
value of commerce-destroying as a decisive 
or secondary operation of the war; the system 
upon which commerce-destroying can be most 
efficiently conducted, whether by scattered 
cruisers or by holding in force some vital center 
through which commercial shipping must pass 
(Mahan as cited in Benner, 2004). In addition, 
it was vital to acquire international colonies, 
naval bases and coaling stations to support both 
military and commercial maritime operations 
(Mahan as cited in Williams, 2008). 
However, there were weaknesses in 
the Mahan concept, specifically about his 
failure to appreciate the importance of convoys 
in a prolonged war and the deep impact of 
submarines, torpedoes and mines in a future 
naval war (Gough, 1988). He also highlighted the 
fallacies of Mahan’s concept, such as his belief that 
the nation needed a concentrated battle fleet, and 
that the Naval forcescould protect the people and 
sea commerce in difficult times. 
Another important contribution, came 
from Turner (2001) who introduces the new 
term “Sea Control” which was intended to 
compare more realistic controls in restricted 
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areas and for limited periods of time. It is 
very difficult to maintain the security of 
the area in  the airspace, under the sea and 
at surface sea today especially in terms of 
maintaining strength overseas. Besides, Turner 
also explained the methods of weapon systems 
in Sea control. 
The complicated nature of maritime 
strategy was discussed by Hattendorf (2013). 
Notably, the navy constitutes only one 
component of the strategy, which should 
incorporate diplomacy, merchant trade and 
sea defence, fishing, safeguarding, conserving 
and defending the exclusive economic zone at 
sea, coastal defence, national borders’ defence, 
and offshore islands security (Hattendorf, 
2013). In essence, maritime strategy involves 
participation in regional and worldwide issues 
relating to the use of oceans, the skies over the 
oceans and the land under the seas besides 
influencing and controlling developments on 
land (Morrison, 2011; Scott, 2004).
In general, strategic maritime studies can 
be divided into two sections. On one hand, the 
discussion has focused on maritime strategy, 
and on the other hand, it has emphasized the 
appropriate concepts and factors affecting the 
strategy. Among pioneer scholars in the field of 
maritime strategy were Mahan (1889), Corbett 
(1911), Booth (1977), Grove (1990), Turner 
(2001), and Till (2005) who have all made major 
contributions to the field.
It is the purpose of this article to discuss 
the evolution and development of maritime 
strategies focusing on the Asia Pacific region. 
In particular, the discussion seeks to investigate 
why states adopt maritime strategy and 
how to implement the strategies. Although 
countries perceive national security to be 
important, yet they have not all focused on 
maritime strategy. Because developing naval 
power is too expensive, due to the vast area 
to protect, and government policy seems to be 
more land-based. The article will first discuss 
the development of maritime strategies for 
continental states including the US, and India. 
Next, the article will analyse the strategies from 
maritime states including United Kingdom, 
Australia, Japan, and Singapore as well as 
Indonesia, one of the largest maritime nations 
and an important founding member of ASEAN, 
a regional institution in Southeast Asia (Sugiarto 
et al., 2017). By doing so, it is hoped that the 
discussion will help maritime countries such 
as Indonesia in formulating its comprehensive 
maritime strategy.
Methods 
Most of the data for this article is obtained 
from secondary sources that are publicly 
accessible which includes official documents 
from Indonesia, the United Kingdom, the 
United States, and Australia. Academic books 
and journals on maritime issues, maritime 
strategies, national security, and reputable 
sources from open access journals, have 
also been consulted. For the purpose of this 
research, this data collected was analyzed using 
Atlas.ti software through coding manuals for 
qualitative research.
Results and Discussion
Maritime Strategy in Continental States: US 
and India
As a superpower, US maritime strategy 
development has undergone several changes in 
accordance with global trends caused by changing 
political events and technological developments. 
The changes can be seen beginning from Ford’s 
1971 presidency that developed the concept of 
the mission of the navy, Reagan’s 1981 Maritime 
strategy, Bush’s 1989 administration and From 
the Sea concept, Clinton’s 1994 forward thinking 
concept of the sea and to Bush’s 2002 Sea power 
21 concept (Swartz, 2005). The view that maritime 
strength does not concern conquering territories 
but also looks at controlling coastlines and 
smaller waterways is also supported by Menon 
who pays attention to amphibious operations in 
history, speed in battle, and the synergy between 
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technology and strategy (Menon, 1998). Next, 
Wiley (2016) who observed that the debate 
over maritime strategy in the 1980s stemmed 
from the United States and its allies’ response 
to Soviet aggression in Central Europe during 
the cold war era on a bipolar world where the 
competition between communist and capitalist 
was at its height. This involved carrier raids 
and amphibious assaults against Soviet in the 
Black, Mediterranean, Norwegian Seas, and 
the Pacific, and the strategy was criticized as 
it appeared to be a rationalization for the 600 
ships involved rather than a serious wartime 
plan. This strategy was seen as unreasonable, 
as once the Soviet military threat subsided, 
the rationale for building the fleet was lost and 
the new administration decided to reduce its 
size, without a corresponding reduction of the 
nation’s overseas obligations. 
Wiley (2016) suggested that the navy and 
marine corps of the Cold War era in the 1970s 
were gradually transformed and embraced 
a more cooperative, sea power strategy for 
the 21st century. This transformation was also 
shaped by the historical experiences of the 
1990s and 2000s. Then, Hoyt (2007) observed 
the need for maritime strategy to extend 
control to the nation’s economic interests and 
guarding it against threats from other states. 
Additionally, Ho (2008) looked at the broader 
focus to prevent conflict, counter terrorism 
and provide humanitarian assistance. This 
shift from a narrow focus on winning wars 
emphasizes cooperation between nations. An 
important contribution was from Taylor (2008) 
who assessed the need for routine and effective 
cooperation between regional and international 
maritime nations to secure a free and safe 
maritime domain. Quite understandably, 
it calls for an integrative and robust global 
maritime alliance that is based on trust, and 
thus, enables greater prevention and security. 
This approach emphasizes the important role 
of governmental and nongovernmental, public 
and private maritime partners.
Additionally, Kraska (2012) cited the 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral, 
Michael G. Mullen, who claimed that sea control 
belonged to old schools of thought whereas 
the newer maritime strategy recognizes that 
the economic strength of nations increase 
when the seas are made safe and free for all. 
Another study, by Bruns (2014), analyses 
U.S. Navy Strategy & American Sea Power 
from “The Maritime Strategy“ (1982-1986) 
to “A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century 
Seapower” (2007). He pointed out the intricate 
links between strategy, planning, and force 
structure, considering theories, sea power, the 
political and military uses of the sea, the links 
between different levels of strategy, naval 
missions, and some particulars of the maritime 
domain that guide formulation of naval and 
maritime strategy (Wiley, 2016).
Subsequently, in 2015, the US revised 
the 2007 maritime strategy with the title 
“A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century 
Seapower” (U.S. Navy, 2015). This was made 
with respect to the vastness of the maritime 
region that required naval forces to protect and 
maintain not only the economic and security 
interests of the U.S, but also the stability 
of the Indo-Asia-Pacific region. Cropsey 
& McGrath (2018) observed that in order 
to formulate global strategy, it requires an 
extensive government plan involving military, 
diplomatic, geo-strategic, industrial workforce, 
and budgetary implications, amongst others. 
Thus, the elements of America’s maritime 
strategy includes diplomacy, economics, 
global, sea control, maritime security, navy 
strength, marine power, maritime cooperation, 
joint concepts, maritime domains, military 
values, politics, and choke point (a narrow strait 
that is strategic for sea shipping lines).
Scholars from India such as Menon (1998) 
emphasized that such tactics are necessary 
as there was a shift from just controlling 
territories towards comprehensive security 
measures involving coastlines and smaller 
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waterways. Dhowan (2015) documented 
the next phase of India's maritime security 
strategy in his masterpiece, Ensuring Secure 
Seas: Indian Maritime Security Strategy that 
discussed various strategic options. These 
include deterrence and conflict strategies, coastal 
and offshore security strategies, maritime force 
and capability development strategies and 
strategies for shaping a favorable and positive 
maritime environment. Dhowan (2015) had 
earlier documented the maritime strategy of 
India and identified various strategic points of 
the sea such as the Suez canal, Strait of Hormuz, 
Straits of Malacca, Singapore Strait, Sunda Strait, 
Lombok Strait, the Ombai Straits. He suggested 
that international sea-lanes become one of the 
considerations in determining its strategy. 
Meanwhile, Chandramohan (2016) conducted 
a major study of India's maritime strategy 
improvement in the Asia-Pacific region. 
Maritime Strategy in Maritime States: UK, 
Australia, Japan, Singapore, and Indonesia
For maritime countries, studies in this 
area include the works of scholars from the UK 
such as Corbett (1911), Ken Booth (1977), James 
Cable (1983), John Richard Hill (2000), Geoffrey 
Till (2005; 2006). Although the UK is not an Asia 
Pacific country, yet its maritime strategy is the 
best and the earliest in the world. Studying 
UK’s maritime strategy is useful in terms of the 
lessons learned for Asia including Indonesia.
Corbett (1911) defined sea command as 
“the control of maritime communications for 
commercial or military purposes”, and that 
maritime strategy is determined by an action 
plan of war that combines the strategies of the 
army and navy. He stressed that naval strength 
cannot be achieved by itself but it constitutes 
part of maritime strategy, and that a successful 
wartime maritime strategy involves the 
intricate connections between land, sea and air 
strengths. Maritime Strategy was never seen as 
relying on communications, but Corbett (1911) 
argued otherwise, attributing the problems of 
Naval Strategy to passage and communication. 
According to Corbett, the maintenance of 
Communications constituted the essence of 
naval influence. Where states are closely related 
to sea warfare and their perfection comes from 
sea command and control. This was augmented 
by Gough (1988) who suggested that keeping 
the lines of operation and communication open 
leads to better strategic functioning of the navy. 
Gough (1988) explains Corbett’s grand and 
minor strategy, the former relating to purpose, 
economic functions and international relations 
and the latter relating to warfare details such as 
planning army, navy or combined operations. It 
required being on the offensive in acquiring and 
influencing the nation’s maritime objectives as 
well as being on the defensive, that is to deny 
the enemy’s objective.
Corbett’s starting point in developing 
naval strategy draws upon Mahan’s notion of 
command of the sea but includes more than 
the massive and decisive confrontation of naval 
forces. As put by forward Williams (2008), the 
objective must always be directly or indirectly 
either to secure the command of the sea or to 
prevent the enemy from securing it. Williams 
(2008) also distinguished between Corbett, 
who acknowledged the importance of naval 
operations and Mahan, who believed that naval 
power was a greater influence than land armies. 
Considering that humans’ natural habitat is 
on land and not the sea, nations at war always 
based decisions on what the army can do 
against the enemy’s territory and maintaining 
control over the country’s land.
In connection with maritime strategy, 
Booth (1977) looked more specifically at the 
role of navy. Booth argued that the function of 
navies in the modern age includes their Policing 
role (Coastguard responsibilities, Nation-
building), Diplomatic Role (Negotiation from 
strength, Manipulation, Prestige), Military 
Role (balance of power, Power Projection). 
While, Till (1984) described maritime strategy 
as comprising two essential parts. First, sea 
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battles that include decisive battles, fleet in 
being (standby fleet), blockade, and second, 
the preventive sea measures such as coastal 
protection, protection of trade, projection of 
power ashore, naval diplomacy and strategic 
deterrence. He synthesized the works of 
various authors (Bateman & Sherwood, 1992). 
Till observed the relativeness of sea power 
which most countries possess. The degree of 
sea power in each country depends on the 
following factors and its combination; their 
naval strength, shipbuilding expertise, skills in 
marine sea power insurance, or their capacity 
to supply seafarers. Furthermore, Till (2005) 
summed up Baer’s (1994) views that to achieve 
sea power, a nation has to internally agree on 
the value of an aggressive big fleet triphibious 
Navy, as outlined by Mahan’s principles, 
besides having public and professional support. 
In reviewing Corbett’s work (1911) that 
advocated an army that works with the navy 
to conquer overseas territories and to outflank 
land-bound adversaries with amphibious 
operations, (as cited in Till, 2006) noted that 
this strategy focuses on confusing rival plans 
and making one’s own and the allies’ positions 
stronger. In addition, Till (2009) suggested 
that the typical problems for navies and 
coastguards include defence inflation, budget 
limitations, resources – commitments gap, sea 
blindness, and land-centric culture. These are 
the limitations for the navy expansion. 
The modern concept of ‘sea control’, is 
defined by the Royal Navy as the exclusive 
freedom and power to exploit the use of part of 
the sea and also, if need be, make it inaccessible 
to rivals. However, besides sea denial, other 
weak naval strategies involve attacking 
merchant ships and coastal hit and run raids. 
Speller (2005) observed the acknowledgement 
given by the authors of British Maritime 
Doctrine (BR1806) to the established concepts of 
maritime strategy that include access, mobility, 
versatility, sustained reach, resilience, lift 
capacity, poise, and leverage. 
According to Grove (2006) who examined 
various Royal Navy documents such as the 
2001, ‘The Future Navy’ and ‘and ‘Future 
Navy Operational Concept’, stressed four core 
capabilities for future fleets, i.e. power projection, 
flexible global reach, optimized access for the 
joint forces via sea control and theatre entry. 
Wide-ranging aspects of maritime security are 
also highlighted such as Command, Control, 
Communications, Computers, Intelligence, 
Surveillance and Reconnaissance (C4ISR). In 
Heuser’s (2010) assessment of Till’s work, he 
highlighted Till’s prediction of paradigm shifts in 
the Western navies post-Cold War (Till, 1994). He 
envisaged that instead of securing sea control and 
protection against raids, there would be a focus 
on coastal strategies and protection, or “littoral 
warfare”. This however constitutes one of the 
many shifts in maritime warfare. 
The British Maritime Doctrine BR 1806 
outlined the important role of navies in the post-
Cold War era. Apart from providing required 
protection and surveillance, their diplomatic 
influence and cooperation in strategic alliances 
is a very fundamental aspect in the fast-
changing regional and international maritime 
domains (Till, 2005). Mière (2013) observed the 
evolving nature of the strategy, while Cable 
(1983) believed that the strength of British 
navies depended on their ability to predict 
as well as the adaptability and plausibility of 
their strategy in relation to present and future 
policies. Generally, though, the aim of British 
maritime strategy was a combination of the 
financial support of Continental allies and 
the exertion of maritime pressure through 
blockade, the threat of amphibious landings, 
attacks and raids on threatened coastlines and 
through the seizure of their adversaries’ far-
flung colonies and bases (Gardner, 2006). 
Additionally, Till also forecasted the 
modern navy tasks in the future that correspond 
with a reduction in resources. Politically, 
naval planners will also receive less strategic 
guidance as compared to during the Cold War 
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era (Till, 2008). This, however, is a reflection 
of the past when British Chiefs complained 
of getting little guidance from their political 
masters, a time that is often seen as a forecast 
and preparation of things to come in the future 
(Grove, 2006). Another major contribution 
comes from Hill (2000) who described the 
tools used by the Medium Powers as ‘levels 
of conflict’ that required understanding the 
levels of command, tasks and management 
of military forces instead of the nature of 
conflict. This concept is also described in the 
“The Joint Doctrine Publication 0-10 British 
Maritime Doctrine” which specifies that the 
hierarchy levels span all warfare areas [tactical, 
operational and strategic] (Britain MoD, 2011).
Be ing  a  mar i t ime  s ta te ,  the  UK 
government issued official maritime security 
strategy documents in 2014 certified by four 
departments, i.e. the Secretary of foreign 
affairs and commonwealth, Secretary of State, 
Secretary of Defense Affairs, and Secretary of 
State for Transport. The main purpose of the 
UK maritime security strategy is as follows:
“To promote a secure international 
maritime domain and uphold 
international maritime norms; to 
develop the maritime governance 
capacity and capabilities of states 
in areas of strategic maritime 
importance; to protect the UK and 
the overseas territories, their citizens 
and economies by supporting the 
safety and security of ports and 
offshore installations and Red Ensign 
Group (REG)-flagged passenger and 
cargo ships; to assure the security 
of vital maritime trade and energy 
transportation routes within the 
UK marine zone, regionally and 
internationally; to protect the 
resources and population of the 
UK and the overseas territories 
from illegal and dangerous activity, 
including serious organised crime 
and terrorism” (British Government, 
2014, pp. 10–11).
The strategy is two-fold; one concerns 
developing national capabilities utilizing 
available resources and the other focusing on 
international cooperation between governments 
to identify, assess and address maritime 
security issues locally and internationally. In 
order to remain relevant, the strategy should 
also be continuously examined and improved. 
On the other part of the continent is 
Australia, an importance US ally. Specifically, 
in strategy, theories of sea power and maritime 
strategy are to be used in warfare and also in 
peaceful times. Secondly, complex principles 
are used during war times and thirdly, that 
joint approaches are used, acknowledging 
the importance of both land and air tactics. 
Lastly, the maritime strategy also includes 
civil components of maritime power (the 
marine industries and maritime infrastructure). 
Essentially, they described the Australian 
maritime strategy as one that optimizes the 
country’s scarce resources to defend and 
protect Australia’s maritime assets against 
any maritime attacks and to uphold a safe and 
secure environment (Bateman & Sherwood, 
1992). 
Meanwhile, Donohue (2000) has listed 
the importance of geography. Considering 
Australia’s geographical location in a region 
with the busiest shipping lanes in the world, 
he highlighted how Australia’s active role is 
instrumental in influencing regional maritime 
cooperation on all levels of defence and 
industry whilst creating and maintaining 
communications with its neighbors. The 
Indonesian maritime project will impact 
Australia and the rest of the Indo-Pacific region 
especially by providing powerful insights 
about the challenges faced in building maritime 
power (Till, 2015, p. 9). Scott (2004) also stated 
that with the advances made in technology, it 
was crucial that air, sea and land forces work 
together, besides integrating the traditional 
blue water maritime concepts of sea denial and 
sea control. 
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The Australian Maritime Doctrine (2000) 
was an Australian spin-off of British formulated 
concepts and reflected the nation’s national 
interests. In writing about the need for nations, 
Till (2005) suggested that Australia should 
retain a greater focus on sea control, and that 
this strategy, together with air control, will 
enable greater influence on land. He stressed 
that the preconditions for sea control should 
not be taken for granted. 
Similarly, McCaffrie (2006) outlined 
the requisites of a maritime strategy as the 
combination of all aspects of national power, 
not excluding the military, economic and 
diplomatic aspects that are deployed for 
national security. The specific requisites for 
an Australian maritime strategy includes 
“mobility in mass, readiness, access, flexibility 
and adaptability, reach, poise and persistence, 
maneuver” (McCaffrie, 2006). Notably, in a 
speech to the Royal Australian Navy (RAN) 
Maritime Conference, Morrison (2011) stressed 
that to ensure the future relevance of maritime 
strategy, it must involve the army or air force 
and that this strategic alliance defines maritime 
strategy. Maritime strategy is therefore, a 
triphibious exercise, and is not exclusive to the 
naval forces. However, Till (2013) added that 
budget constraints may limit the use of maritime 
concepts and for maritime strategy to be fully 
implemented, Australia needed to defend 
navigation freedom, to actively pursue measures 
that reduce the risks of accidental encounters 
at sea and to develop wider naval relationship 
networks of mutual benefit around the region.
In examining the security threats at sea, 
Percy (2013) identified four security risks, 
i.e. piracy; people smuggling (both illegal 
migration and human trafficking); illegal, 
unreported and unauthorized (IUU) fishing; 
and narcotics smuggling. By focusing on 
narcotics smuggling, which is considered 
one of the longest criminal maritime security 
threats, he also discussed different types of 
control and whether these maritime threats can 
be resolved by traditional maritime strategy. 
Furthermore, Kainikara (2013) not only agreed 
with the view that air strategy is essential to Sea 
control, but also that success of sea control is 
relative to the ability of the air force to control 
the air. For maritime strategy to be successful, 
therefore, it requires strong support from air 
strategy. 
The next topic for discussion is the 
development of maritime strategies in Japan, 
and Singapore. According to Kaneda (2002) 
the development of maritime strategy in Japan, 
faced threats from North Korean missiles and 
spy ships in the form of “Taepodong”, during 
the post-Cold War era. This led to Japan’s 
“maritime coalition” strategy that involved 
building an integrated, anti-ballistic missile 
system, using information systems. Research 
on Singapore’s Maritime Strategy focused on 
the Straits of Malacca and the need to maintain 
international co-operation and develop a 
balanced military strength with respect to other 
nations (Rotte, 2002).
Indonesia is an important state in the 
region. Its free trade island city, Batam, has 
contributed wealth to Indonesia (Adiwan, 
2017). Specific studies on Indonesian maritime 
strategy are limited. Indonesian scholars 
include Mangindaan (2002) whose article 
Maritime Strategy Indonesia in 2000-2010, 
argued that due to the financial difficulties 
facing Indonesia in safeguarding national 
interests in maritime territory, it is strongly 
recommended and necessary to cooperate with 
other forces such as official political-diplomatic 
power and cooperation among departments. 
Keliat (2009) examined two areas of Indonesian 
maritime strategy; i.e. the concept of maritime 
safety and its implications for Indonesia. Other 
similar research studies include one by Melda 
(2009) who described the Indonesian view of 
maritime security in South East Asia, as well as 
Forward (2009) who worked on “the Indonesian 
submission to determine the validity of the 
IMO’s declaration at international law”. 
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The researcher Djalal (2013) examined the 
responsibilities and capabilities of the country 
with regard to its diverse land, air, sea and 
seabed boundaries. This study was undertaken 
in light of the widening territories of the Unitary 
State of the Republic of Indonesia as a result of 
the worldwide acceptance of UNCLOS 1982. 
To this end, Sebastian, Supriyanto, & Arsana 
(2014) observed the need for Indonesia to take 
measures in re-strategizing its diplomatic, 
legal, and security initiatives to face potential 
external maritime challenges. On the other 
hand, Indonesian maritime policies against 
illegal foreign fishing in Indonesian waters, has 
jeopardized the ambitions of China’s Maritime 
Silk Road Initiative and Indonesia’s Global 
Maritime Fulcrum. It has also economically 
hurt China’s fishing industry (Hongzhou, 
2015). In addition, with the appearance of 
non-traditional maritime security problems, 
Indonesia should reformulate its maritime 
strategy (Buddy, Zarina, & Farizal, 2018).
Furthermore, the national maritime 
strategy of other countries and the establishment 
of Indonesia’s national maritime strategy will 
support the role of naval diplomacy in the 
future (Marsetio, 2014). Salim (2015) also 
explained that since 2005, the Indonesian Navy 
has formulated the Nusantara Marine Defense 
System and continued with the formulation 
of the Indonesian Maritime Defense System. 
However, this concept is not fully supported 
with higher level commitment, so it cannot be 
used as a reference in carrying out maritime 
defense. Additionally, Setianegara’s (2014) 
writing about maritime strategy on Nusantara 
naval and the world maritime axis, considered 
several factors including maritime history, 
environmental geopolitical order, maritime 
trade and energy security, maritime control, 
strategy on time of peace and conflict time, 
and strength development strategy. Others 
like Suropati, Sulaiman & Montratama (2016) 
suggested the need for Indonesia to study 
strategic forward defense (SFD) to face external 
threats in the navy and air force sectors. This 
concurs with the concept of a blue water navy 
as practiced by the US and UK. 
Hattendorf (1989) stated that although 
Britain and the United States held different 
positions in late 19th and in the 20th century, they 
saw a common need to take on a leadership role 
in controlling the basic network of bases and fleets 
around the world. This change was necessary to 
maintain a balance of power, especially against 
other land-based rivals. This view was strongly 
validated by Gough (1988) who maintained 
the relevance of principles founded by the two 
classical theorists, Alfred Thayer Mahan and Sir 
Julian Stafford Corbett. Essentially, he outlined 
three considerations resulting from their work; 
firstly, the vital economic and political aspect 
of sea security. Second, the need for big and 
small nations to take sea power seriously, and 
third, the rich naval lessons to be learnt from 
historian-strategists that need to be digested 
and well understood. Till (2005) also strongly 
advocated the application of the Mahanian and 
Corbettian theories, acknowledging the fact that 
they needed to be used in the specific contexts of 
the national security strategies of each country. 
He concluded, however, that the basic concepts 
of maritime strategy are universally and generally 
applicable (Till, 2005). 
Gardner, Roskill and Gretton (2006) 
concluded that the traditional principles of 
maritime strategy were not required to make 
huge changes because of new technology. 
Brittania’s role as a world police force meant 
that they were successful in halting the slave 
trade and in diminishing pirates (Gough, 1988). 
However, as a result of the shifts in Western 
Europe’s balance of power, its role was also 
increasingly supplemented by the naval 
strength of Germany, Japan and the United 
States. As Brittania’s rule over the seas since 
1815 was coming to an end, the focus became 
who would replace Brittania’s lead as well as 
how the direction of international affairs would 
be configured in the future.
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From discussions about the development 
of maritime strategies by the American, British, 
Australian, Japanese, Indian, Singapore and 
Indonesian governments, the similarities and 
differences in elements of maritime strategy 
between maritime countries and continental 
countries are displayed in Table 1.
From the Table 1 it can be seen that the 
different elements of maritime strategy in 
maritime countries compared to continental 
countries are access, adaptive, balance, 
conserving and defending the exclusive 
economic, defence, deterrence, fishing, 
influence, maneuver, maritime coalition, 
maritime development, maritime environment, 
national borders’ defence, naval strength, 
power projection, sea denial, sea dependency, 
technological expertise, and the methods of 
weapon systems in sea control.
Furthermore, from the discussion, the 
elements of maritime strategy in each country 
have similarities and differences. This can be 
seen in Table 2.
From Table 2, the elements of Indonesia’s 
maritime strategy are based on suggestions 
from earlier research recommendations that 
Indonesia’s maritime strategy should have 
elements of diplomacy, economy, sea control, 
maritime security, joint concepts, war and 
peace time, trade, forward defense, politics, 
and maritime history. Therefore, Indonesia 
needs to formulate a maritime strategy, which 
is in line with national interests and strategic 
environmental situations and by considering 
strategy concepts from experts or other 
countries that already have maritime strategies.
Conclusion
As one of the countries in the Asia Pacific, 
Indonesia is considered a maritime country, yet 
it can learn key elements for shaping its maritime 
strategies from continental countries such as 
the United States, and India, namely threats, 
diplomacy, economics, geography, global, sea 
control, maritime security, navy strength, sea 
Table 1. 
Elements of Maritime Strategies in 
Continental States vs. Maritime States
No
Maritime States 
(UK, Australia, 
Japan, Singapore, 
and Indonesia)
Continental States (US and 
India)
1. Access -
2. Adaptive -
3. Balance -
4. Choke Point Choke Point
5. Coastal Defence Coastal Defence
6. Command at Sea Command at Sea
7. Communication Communication
8. Cooperation Cooperation
9. - Conserving and Defending 
The Exclusive Economic Zone 
at Sea
10. Defence -
11. Deterrence -
12. Diplomacy Diplomacy
13. Economy Economy
14. - Fishing
15. Global Global
16. Influence -
17. Joint Joint
18. Maneuver -
19. Maritime Coali-
tion
-
20. Maritime Devel-
opment
-
21. Maritime Domain Maritime Domain
22. Maritime Envi-
ronment
-
23. Military Value Military Value
24. Mobility Mobility
25. Naval Base Naval Base
26. - National Borders’ Defence
27. - Naval Strength
28. Politic Politic
29. Power Projection -
30. Sea Control Sea Control
31. Sea Denial -
32. Sea Power Sea Power
33. Security Security
34. Sea Dependency -
35. Technological 
Expertise
-
36. Threat Threat
37. Trade Trade
38. - The Methods of Weapon 
Systems in Sea Control
39. War and Peace 
Situation
War and Peace Situation
Source: Compiled by Authors
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power, maritime cooperation, joint concepts, 
maritime domain, value of military, deterrence, 
coastal defence politics, and choke point. 
Furthermore, Indonesia also can learn from 
maritime states such as UK, Australia, Japan, 
and Singapore about several key elements on 
maritime strategy particularly, adaptive, access, 
balance, maritime coalition, communication, war 
and peacetime, mobility, naval base, sea denial, 
trade, command at sea, and power projection. 
In addition, the thoughts of scholars such as 
Mahan, Corbett, Hattendorf, Turner, Ken Booth, 
Table 2. 
Strategy Elements According to Selected Countries 
No Element U.S. India UK. Australia Japan Singapore Indonesia
1 Adaptive - - ✓ - - - -
2 Access - - ✓ ✓ - - -
3 Threat ✓ - ✓ ✓ - - ✓
4 Diplomacy ✓ - ✓ ✓ - - ✓
5 Economy ✓ - - ✓ - - -
6 Geography - - - ✓ - - -
7 Global ✓ - ✓ - - - -
8 Sea Control ✓ - ✓ ✓ - - ✓
9 Maritime Security ✓ ✓ ✓ - - ✓
10 Navy strength ✓ - - - - - -
11 Sea Power ✓ - ✓ ✓ - - -
12 Maritime Cooperation ✓ - ✓ ✓ - ✓ -
13 Balance - - - ✓ - ✓ -
14 Maritime Coalition - - - - ✓ - -
15 Communication - - - ✓ - - -
16 Joint Concepts ✓ - ✓ ✓ - - ✓
17 Maneuver - - - - - - -
18 Maritime Domain ✓ - ✓ ✓ - - -
19 War and Peace Time - - - ✓ - - ✓
20 Method in Sea Control - - - - - - -
21 Mobility - - ✓ ✓ - - -
22 Value of Military ✓ - ✓ ✓ - - -
23 Naval Base - - ✓ - - - -
24 Deterrence - ✓ - - - -
25 Influence - - - - - - -
26 Sea denial - - ✓ ✓ - - -
27 Trade - - ✓ - - - ✓
28 Fishery - - - - - - -
29 Command at sea - - ✓ - - - -
30 Sea Boundary Defense - - - - - -
31 Forward Defence - - - - - - ✓
32 Coastal Defence - ✓ ✓ - - - -
33 Politic ✓ - - - - - ✓
34 Power Projection - - ✓ - - - -
35 Maritime History - - - - - - ✓
36 Choke point ✓ ✓ - - - ✓ -
Note:  
✓ : available  
-  :  not available
Source: Complied by Authors
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and Till, other elements of maritime strategy 
can be implemented by Indonesia including 
geography, policing, maneuver, methods in 
sea control, influence, fishery, technological 
expertise and sea boundary defense.
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